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S
ocial scientists and many biologists
are all preoccupied in different
ways with the nature and effects of
the ways incentives inﬂuence be-
havior. One type of incentive is clearly in-
trinsic; it originates within a person and is
often linked to exploratory behavior, he-
donic pleasure from self-determined mas-
tery, and desire to satisfy curiosity for its
own sake (1). Another type of incentive is
extrinsic; typically, it is designed and ad-
ministered by an outside person or author-
ity, is precise, and is usually ﬁnancial, tied to
fame, or has some other kind of monetiz-
able status. Because of its various natures,
intrinsic motivation is difﬁcult to measure
and observe. An adventurous step is to
measure brain activity during conditions of
apparent intrinsic and extrinsic motivation.
Murayama et al. (2) do exactly this. Their
results are striking evidence for a phenom-
enon often noted in social psychology—
namely, extrinsic incentives (e.g., pay) can
undermine intrinsic incentives (e.g., fun).
Neural Evidence of Incentive
Undermining
To explore this undermining effect neu-
rally, Murayama et al. (2) create a para-
digm in which subjects must press a button
5 s after the end of a brief stopwatch (SW)
cue. The task is engaging enough that
subjects often do it for fun during a free-
choice period after they are scanned.
The control subjects never received
ﬁnancial rewards for accuracy (and per-
haps importantly, also did not know that
other subjects did receive rewards). The
treatment subjects received bonus rewards
for accuracy in their ﬁrst session, but no
rewards in the next (removed incentives)
session. The typical undermining effect is
observed in behavior during free-choice
periods after the scanning: the reward
treatment subjects played the SW game
less often.
A 2 × 2 ANOVA showed signiﬁcantly
greater blood-oxygen dependent level
(BOLD) response to winning in the reward
treatment compared with the control
treatment in brain regions previously as-
sociated with reward. Speciﬁcally, BOLD
signal responses to win trials (compared with
lose trials) show a clear increase in BOLD
level in the anterior striatum (caudate head)
and the midbrain (which is known to project
dopaminergic neurons to the striatum and
prefrontal cortex). The results show that
adding extrinsic incentives does increase
reward-related response to wins (and sub-
jects were more accurate in that condition).
More interestingly, in the second session
when the extrinsic incentive was removed,
BOLD signal disappears in response to
wins in the treatment condition. A similar
pattern is shown in lateral prefrontal cortex
(LPFC) when the task cue is ﬁrst presented,
indicating an SW trial (instead of an un-
engaging watch-stop control trial simply
requiring a button press). The LPFC activity
is sensibly interpreted as cognitive prepara-
tion associated with higher or lower moti-
vation (3).
The piece de resistance is a ﬁnal cross-
subject neurometric analysis linking brain
activity to postscanning behavior. Mur-
ayama et al. (2) ﬁnd a signiﬁcant correla-
tion between the principal component of
win-response BOLD reductions in three








and postscanner choice to play the SW
game. This indicates that undermining is
stronger for some people than others, and
it might be possible to identify the strength
of such an effect ex ante from functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) (or
another measure such as EEG, because
LPFC is easy to localize in that way).
Understanding the neural basis (and
robustness) of undermining is extremely
important for both practical and scien-
tiﬁc reasons.
The phenomenon is important in prac-
tice, because small concrete incentives
are now being tried in a wide variety
of domains such as public health and
schooling. Most studies ﬁnd that small
concrete ﬁnancial incentives, which reward
good educational habits (prizes for reading
books or good attendance), can change
behavior substantially (4). Some of these
positive results fade out over time, but
some persist (contrary to the undermining
prediction). One interpretation is that
concrete incentives act like instructions,
which both tell students exactly what at-
tainable actions they should be doing
and motivate them to act (5).
Scientiﬁcally, which incentives work to
motivate people, and why, is a topic that
cuts across all social sciences. Sociologists,
anthropologists, political scientists, and
economists emphasize the incentive effects
of norms and roles, culture, elections
and laws, and prices, respectively. These
different emphases often lead to conten-
tious debates and even to completely
opposing recommendations.
Economists as a group espouse enor-
mous faith in ﬁnancial incentives. One
popular book (6) boldly states, “Incentives
matter. The literature of economics con-
tains tens of thousands of empirical studies
verifying this proposition, and not one
that convincingly refutes it” (p. 9 in ref. 6).
In the conduct of economics experiments,
it is de rigeur to use ﬁnancial incentives,
because incentives offered by simply
keeping score “are likely to be weak, er-
ratic, and easily dominated by transactions
costs, and subjects may be readily satiated
with ‘point’ proﬁts” (p. 277 in ref. 7).
One recent imaging study does indicate
that real consumer purchases activate
reward regions more strongly and broadly
than hypothetical choices (8), providing
some support for experimental practice.
The undermining shown by Murayama
et al. (2) is actually not inconsistent with
the hypothesis that incentives matter;
instead, it simply shows that removing
an extrinsic incentive can do harm. One
of the original experiments (9) on under-
mining showed that, when children col-
ored pictures for fun, introducing a crisp
extrinsic ﬁnancial incentive—money per
picture colored—had two interesting ef-
fects. First, the added extrinsic incentive
would increase effort and productivity in
the short run (sometimes at the expense of
quality). This effect suggests that adding
the extrinsic incentive on top of the in-
trinsic incentive had a positive effect.
Second, when the extrinsic incentive was
removed, effort and productivity then fell
to a level below the original level. This
change suggests that the extrinsic incentive
actually permanently eroded the original
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intrinsic incentive or “crowded it out”
(the phrase used by economists). The im-
portant lesson is that increased incentives
should be applied carefully, because re-
moving them might damage or destroy
a preexisting intrinsic incentive.
Theories of Incentive Undermining
Although undermining is not new, it is
also not well-understood (10). An early
psychological explanation was that people
perceive their motivation as caused solely
by extrinsic incentives when they are in-
troduced, and therefore, when those in-
centives are removed, their perceived
motivation is removed also. A related view,
called cognitive evaluation (11), is that the
coercive extrinsic incentive somehow ex-
tinguishes self-determination. Until these
accounts are ﬂeshed out (actually, brained
out) in terms of their associated neural
computations, it is hard to say whether
the neural evidence supports one view or
another. It is possible that self-perception
or reduced self-determination is happening
upstream and inﬂuences signals in striatum,
midbrain, and preparation in LPFC. If so,
we should, in principle, be able to image
a more general neural circuit including
other activity in future studies.
Economists have also struggled to make
sense of undermining using standard
mathematical tools of rational choice. One
explanation is that a lot of apparent in-
trinsic motivation is actually a response to
fuzzy extrinsic incentives (which are dif-
ﬁcult to observe and hence, are over-
attributed to intrinsic motivation). If so,
then introducing clearer extrinsic incen-
tives can remove the fuzzy ones and po-
tentially reduce overall incentive (12). For
example, a worker might be unsure what is
expected of her to get ahead, and there-
fore, she works extra hard to be sure to
reach that fuzzy goal. When the goal is
made clear (e.g., a tangible promotion
target), she can afford to work less hard,
because the risk of falling short of a fuzzy
goal is gone. Another theory is that an
extrinsic incentive established by an au-
thority conveys information about the job’s
difﬁculty or the worker’s ability, which can
reduce motivation (13). These economic
explanations are meant to apply to work-
ers in ﬁrms, and therefore, they do not
offer a particularly persuasive account of
a much simpler behavior, like the SW task;
however, they do deserve much more
attention nonetheless.
Another theory rooted in economics is
that people do not know what the attain-
able reward (or wage) is for different tasks.
When a reward level is established, it be-
comes a reference point for what is ex-
pected. When the reward is reduced,
people withdraw effort in a microstrike to
get the wage restored. A behavioral pre-
diction of this theory is that, over time, the
reward value and intrinsic motivation will
return as people realize that the reward
will not be restored, and they will stop
striking. This account ﬁts with the re-
duction in LPFC activity after incentives
are removed but does not easily explain the
fact that striatal and midbrain responses to
wins are also lower when incentives are
removed. Neurally, this theory predicts an
increase in regions associated with per-
ceptions of unfairness in bargaining when
the incentive is removed [such neural ac-
tivity is not examined by Murayama et al.
(2) but is becoming understood in other
studies (14, 15)].
The most promising explanation, noted
by Murayama et al. (2), is that the brain
adaptively codes reward based on recent
reward levels and ranges, ﬁctive outcomes,
social comparison, and other yardsticks
(16). When an extrinsic reward is re-
moved, the residual intrinsic motivation
seems smaller than if there were no extra
reward in the ﬁrst place. Thus, the exper-
imental treatment group that underwent
removed incentives would perceive less
intrinsic motivation than control subjects
who never received extra rewards at all.
Besides massive evidence of adaptive
coding in perception and psychophysics,
there is now substantial evidence for this
kind of adaptive coding in reward from
behavior, fMRI (16), and single-unit re-
cording (17, 18).
There is clearly plenty more to un-
derstand about the nature, persistence,
and implications of the undermining
effect. Murayama et al. (2) make large
strides in this simple paper by showing
both a reduction in apparent reward cod-
ing of wins (in striatum and midbrain)
from removed incentives and a corre-
sponding reduction of cognitive prepara-
tion in LPFC. These aggregated responses
also reliably predict postscanner task mo-
tivation across subjects in a remarkable
neurometric match of brain activity and
plainly observable behavior. Their won-
derfully simple time-guessing SW task
works well to generate enough intrinsic
incentive that undermining can reliably
occur. However, it would be useful to ex-
plore a variety of other tasks and longer
time periods (to see whether intrinsic in-
centive is ever spontaneously restored).
Exploring the neural bases of the econo-
mists’ theories about displacement of fuzzy
extrinsic incentives and incentives signaling
difﬁculty or skill would be worthwhile as
well. Additionally, as their cross-subject
neurometric correlation shows, there are
individual differences in response to re-
moved incentives, suggesting possible fur-
ther inﬂuences of genes, age, culture,
description framing, etc.
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